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Abstract 
Purpose: This paper examines the common stock price reaction and the changes to the 
risk exposure of the cross listing for REITs.  
Design/methodology/approach: The paper adopts the event study methodology to 
assess the abnormal returns. Pre- and post- cross listing changes in the risk exposure 
for the domestic and foreign markets are examined, via a modified two-factor 
international asset pricing model. A comparison is made for two broad cross listings, 
namely the depositary receipts and the dual ordinary listings, to examine the impacts 
from institutional differences.    
Findings: Cross-listed REITs generally experience positive and significant abnormal 
returns throughout the event window, implying significant superior returns associated 
with the cross listing for REITs. On systematic risks, REITs exhibit significant decline in 
their domestic market beta coefficients after the cross listing. However, the foreign 
market beta coefficients do not yield conclusive evidence when compared across the 
sample.   
Research limitations/implications: Results are consistent with prudential asset 
allocation for potential diversification gains from the cross listing, as the reduction from 
the domestic market beta is more significant than changes in the foreign market beta. 
Practical implications: The results and findings should incentivise REIT managers to 
explore viable cross listing. 
Social implications: Such cross listing for REITs should enhance risk diversification. 
Originality/value: This is a pioneer study on cross-listing of REITs. It provides a basis 
for investment decision-making, and could provoke further research and discussion. 
Key words: Cross-listing, REITs, Event Study Methodology, Asia, US and Europe,  
International Asset Pricing Model. 
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Introduction 
 
The real estate investment trust (REIT) sector has witnessed rapid growth and 
heightened interest in the developed and emerging countries.  According to information 
at REIT.com (downloaded on 27/04/2016), the FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Global Real Estate 
Index included 487 in 38 countries worldwide as of 30th September 2015. Equity REITs 
accounted for 79% of the $1.2 trillion ($948 billion) Developed Markets Index equity 
market capitalisation as of 30th September 2015. This shows a 66.9% growth in the 
market capitalisation of $568 billion reported by Ernst and Young (2010). Furthermore 
rapid globalization in the financial markets as a result of the deregulation of the markets 
fuelled cross-listing of securities (Gagnon and Karolyi, 2011). Proliferation of cross-
listings has resulted in intense competition among the major securities markets to attract 
and retain listings to provide investors with a wider range of investment products. 
Although research findings are somewhat mixed, there appears to be a general 
consensus among most researchers that cross-listing enables companies and investors 
worldwide to connect seamlessly across geographical boundaries and time zones, and 
helps to raise capital at a relatively lower cost (Dodd, 2013) by breaching the barriers 
posed by market segmentation (Stapleton & Subrahmanyam, 1977) and providing 
diversification benefits. 
 
Given the benefits of cross-listing, and REITs being characteristically capital intensive 
and heavily reliant on leverage, one would have expected REITs markets to have 
warmed up to cross-listing. The sluggish attitude of the REIT market towards cross-listing 
could be due to uncertainties about the probability of translating the benefits of cross-
listing to the REIT market which could be a function of lack of research on the issue as 
none of the extant literature relates to REITs which is a distinct asset class. Therefore 
given the robust growth of the REIT sector and cross-listing becoming readily accessible 
worldwide, it may be timely to explore the potential benefits of cross-listing to REITs to 
provide a basis for REITs fund managers and investors in making informed investment 
decisions; and for governments in regulating capital flows. A secondary motive is to 
provoke research and debate among real estate academics and practitioners. Thus the 
paper applies the literature on cross-listing to examine the market’s reaction to cross-
listed REITs. This will be done by answering the following questions: 
 
“Does cross-listing lead to superior returns for REITs in general?” 
“Does cross-listing lower REITs’ domestic markets’ risk?” 
“Does cross-listing lower REITs’ foreign markets’ risk?” 
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These questions are explored and empirically analysed and discussed to 
ascertain their implications for REITs fund managers and investors. Furthermore 
the impact of the two main cross-listing vehicles, depository receipts (DRs) and 
dual ordinary listings (DOLs), are compared to ascertain their relative 
performances in relation to the three questions that the paper sets out to answer. 
The paper is organised as follows. The next (second) section provides an 
overview of cross-listing. This is followed by literature review (section three) while 
the fourth section deals with data collection and the empirical methodologies 
adopted for the study. The fifth section is a discussion of the results and findings 
while the last section provides concluding remarks. 
. 
 
Overview of Cross Listing 
 
The cross-listing concept has been in existence for more than a century (Sarkissian and 
Schill, 2010) although its popularity increased exponentially only in recent decades. 
Cross listing involves at least two markets, with a debut primary listing typically in the 
country of incorporation (often referred to as the home/local market). This type of cross 
listing is often called dual ordinary listing (DOL). An example of a DOL REIT is the 
Singapore listed Fortune REIT, which chose to dual-list on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange (SEHK).  Table 1 provides a list of REITs that were concurrently listed on two 
exchanges at the time of the research 
 
Table 1. List of REITs Concurrently Listed on More Than One Stock Exchange 
 First Listing Dual Listing 
1. Associated Estates 
Realty Corporation 
New York 
Stock 
Exchange 
 
11-Nov-
1993 
NASDAQ 5-Jun-2008 
2. Fortune Real Estate 
Investment Trust 
Singapore 
Stock 
Exchange 
 
12-Aug-
2003 
Hong Kong 
Stock 
Exchange  
20-Apr-
2010 
3. Intercapital Property 
Development REIT 
Bulgaria Stock 
Exchange 
 
5-Nov-2005 Warsaw Stock 
Exchange 
11-Aug-
2010 
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4. Montea SCA Euronext 
Brussels 
 
17-Oct-
2006 
Euronext Paris 2-Jan-2007 
5. Unibail-Rodamco SE 
(merger) 
Euronext Paris 22-Jun-
2007 
 
Euronext 
Amsterdam 
22-Jun-
2007 
(Source: Authors’ compilation, 2012; 2016) 
 
Note: This list excludes REITs concurrently listed prior to their conversion to 
REITs (in cases where REIT legislation was introduced later). 
 
Cross listing has benefits (see literature review), and costs which vary with the Exchange 
on which the second listing takes place (see LSE, 2016; SEC, 2012; Cormick, 2016). 
Companies bear the initial listing costs related to the listing requirements of the 
Exchange for the second listing. The more reputable the Exchange for the second listing 
is, the more stringent the listing requirements – disclosure and transparency, 
governance, regulatory, filing of all the documentations at the appropriate time, 
registration, compliance, etc. – are to result in a relatively higher initial listing costs. 
However, the valuation enhancement effects of cross listing have been found to be 
directly related to the reputation/prestige of the Exchange on which the stocks are cross- 
listed (Cetorelli and Peristiani, 2015). Furthermore, flotation cost (for the services of the 
sponsor and advisers) and the cost of admission to the Exchange (admission fee) are 
incurred by the company. Since these costs can be recouped, in the short term, only 
through proceeds from the sale of shares on the second Exchange (as well as other 
benefits of cross-listing discussed in the literature review), managers capitalize on the 
“window of opportunity” effect to dual list. In other words, REIT managers tend to take 
advantage of good market conditions (“window of opportunity”) to cross-list during 
periods of exceptional performance (Sarkissian and Schill, 2009; Fadl, 2010) to facilitate 
attractive pricing of the stock to ensure a successful launch of the shares.  Thus investors 
who subscribe to dual listed REIT IPO stocks may purchase the stocks at a relatively 
higher price to provide the company with “enough” sale proceeds to recoup the initial 
listing costs and, in addition, make a decent profit. Furthermore annual service and 
compliance costs are incurred which must be out-weighed by the valuation enhancement 
benefits attendant to dual listing (see literature review).  
 
A depositary receipt (DR), another form of cross listing, is an indirect ownership of shares 
through a negotiable instrument issued by a depositary institution.  Each DR is 
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represented by a specific number of underlying shares (dependent on the DR ratio) held 
by a local custodian (in the issuer’s home Securities Exchange market) of the Depository 
Institution in the US or the Global Market.  Figure 1 shows an example of the sequence 
of events involving a DR transaction. DRs were originally introduced to enable investors 
acquire foreign companies’ shares without the costs of complex transactional barriers 
and high fees involving cross-border transactions.  They are categorized as the American 
Depositary Receipts (ADRs) when listed on US securities exchange or the Global 
Depositary Receipts (GDRs) when listed outside the US, predominantly in Europe, 
especially on the London Stock Exchange (LSE).  
 
They can be publicly offered or privately placed. The distinguishing features of the 
different types of ADRS: Level I, Level II, Level III and Rule 144A, and the GDRs are 
presented in Table 2. To date, there are 7 REITs with DRs as listed in Table 3. ADRs 
and GDRs, like DOLs, must be registered with the regulatory authorities of the Securities 
Exchanges on which the DRs are listed. Thus the company issuing the DRs (the issuer) 
incurs listing costs similar to those incurred by a company involved in DOL (see LSE, 
2016; and SEC, 2012). Furthermore the ADR/GDR Depository Bank may be authorised 
under the deposit agreement relating to the DRs to charge a fee, Custody/Depository 
Service  fee, to compensate for inventorying the foreign shares and performing 
registration, compliance, dividend payments, communication and record keeping 
services. In addition, Depository Banks may charge a fee for foreign currency as 
dividends are first paid in the issuer’s home currency. This implies that investors in DRs 
are exposed to currency risk. The issuer hopes to recoup its initial listing costs through 
“attractive” pricing of DRs launched in the “window of opportunity”. 
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Figure 1. Example of a Depositary Receipt Transaction upon Issuance and Cancellation 
 
(Source: J.P. Morgan, 2005; and Authors, 2012 & 2016) 
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Table 2. Key features of Depositary Receipts 
 ADR GDR 
 Level l ADR 
Level ll 
ADR 
Level lll 
ADR 
Rule 144A 
ADR 
GDR / Reg S 
Description Unlisted 
Listed in 
US 
Offered & 
listed in US 
Private 
placement to 
Qualified 
Institutional 
Buyers in US 
Global private placement 
in two or more markets 
outside the issuer’s home 
market 
Trading 
Quoted in 
over-the-
counter (OTC) 
Pink Sheets 
and/or on OTC 
Bulletin Board 
NYSE, 
Amex or 
Nasdaq 
NYSE, Amex 
or Nasdaq 
Quoted on 
PORTAL 
Typically in London Stock 
Exchange and 
Luxembourg Stock 
Exchange. Others include 
Dubai and Singapore 
Share 
issuance 
Existing 
shares 
Existing 
shares 
New equity 
capital raised 
(Public 
offering) 
New equity 
capital raised 
(Private 
offering) 
New equity capital raised 
(Private offering) 
Accounting 
disclosure 
Home US GAAP 
US 
GAAP 
Home 
Dependent on 
international exchange 
selected 
SEC 
Registration 
Exempt Full Full Exempt - 
(Source: Authors’ compilation, 2012; 2016) 
 
 
Table 3. List of REITs with Depositary Receipts 
 Exchange Country Main Stock 
Listing Date 
DR Effective 
Date 
DR Termination 
Date 
1. Westfield Group OTC Australia 5-Jul-2004 21-Nov-2006 On-going 
2. Elarg Agricultural 
Opportunity Fund 
Reg S Bulgaria 15-Jun-2005 1-Mar-2007 Ongoing 
3. Mercialys SA OTC France 12-Oct-2005 13-Aug-2009 9-Aug-2012 
4. Unibail-Rodamco SE OTC France 22-Jun-2007  On-going 
5. Property for Industry 
Limited 
OTC New 
Zealand 
12-Dec-1994  On-going 
6. EGS Gayrimenkul 
Yatirim Ortakligi AS 
PORTAL Turkey 18-Mar-1998 13-Mar-1998 10-Mar-2009 
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7. Primary Health 
Properties PLC 
OTC United 
Kingdom 
5-Nov-1998 31-Mar-2008 On-going 
(Source: Authors’ compilation, 2012; 2016) 
Note: This list excludes REITs whose DRs began prior to their conversion to REITs (in 
cases where REIT legislation was introduced later). 
 
Dual listed companies (DLCs) are a third form of cross listing that involves a merger of 
two listed companies. DLCs differ from dual listing by having combined operations and 
cash flows while retaining distinctly separate shareholder registries and original identities 
– Their stocks are not fungible. Given the marked differences between DLCs and the 
other dual listings, DLCs are excluded from the study. To date, there are only 12 DLCs 
of which 6 have disbanded (Bedi & Tennant, 2002) and none of them are REITs.  
 
The Related Literature 
 
According to conventional wisdom, cross-listings have many associated benefits 
(Karolyi, 2006).Stapleton and Subrahmanyam (1977) suggest that cross-listing can 
circumvent market segmentation which results  from market barriers that are mainly due 
to exchange rate risks and restrictions on foreign direct investments (Jithendranathan et 
al., 2000). This hypothesis posits that  overcoming market barriers results in reduced 
cost of capital and increased firm value. Alexander et al (1987 and 1988) postulate and 
evidence that lower expected returns are expected from cross-listing if markets were 
previously segmented.  Based on a sample of Canadian and non-Canadian firms that 
cross-listed in the US, the decline was less for the former firms. This led to the 
explanation that the magnitude of decline was associated with the degree of 
segmentation.  
 
On broadening the investor base, Merton (1987) developed the investor recognition 
hypothesis by modifying Sharpe-Linter’s Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
assumption that investors hold identical information. Merton (1987) posits that investors 
prefer to invest in securities that they are familiar with otherwise they require higher 
expected returns to compensate for the increased idiosyncratic risk. All else being equal, 
a larger investor’ base improves stocks liquidity to lower the investors’ expected return 
and enhance security value. A similar outcome of lower expected returns is suggested 
by the liquidity hypothesis. Using bid-ask spreads as parameters, Amihud and 
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Mendelson (1986) postulate that because liquidity risk premiums are reduced upon 
cross-listing, the expected returns fall accordingly to facilitate share price enhancement. 
 
Stulz (1999) and Coffee (1999, 2002) have suggested that gains from cross-listing are 
more likely to hail from better investor protection and corporate governance.  Reese and 
Weisbach (2002) have showed that non-US firms raise more equity in their domestic 
common stock markets after cross-listing in the US, and experiences reduced cost of 
debt.  Doidge et al (2004) affirm this finding after controlling for firm and country 
characteristics. Coffee (1999, 2002) demonstrates that managers are “bonded” to 
improve corporate governance and become less able to exploit private benefits after 
cross-listing. Minority investors are most protected especially if the cross-listed 
Exchange imposes tougher legal and regulatory requirements. He attributes the 
“bonding” effect to  imposed regulations like disclosures, the enforcement powers of the 
regulatory body, more effective and lower-cost investor actions, such as class actions 
that may otherwise be unavailable.  
 
Cantale (1996), Fuerst (1998) and Moel (1999) have suggested that by cross-listing in a 
more regulated market, the need to adhere to stricter disclosure requirements serves as 
a signal of higher quality to investors than for the non-cross-listed firms.  Information 
asymmetry improves that could otherwise compel investors to demand higher returns to 
compensate for idiosyncratic risk. Recent literature postulates that cross-listing facilitates 
product market identification and aids in raising visibility within foreign markets (Pagano 
et al, 2002; Lins et al, 2005).  It is because the companies concerned are mostly large 
and export-oriented, enabling them to increase sales by capitalising on their product 
market reputation. This ability helps to facilitate acquisitions financed with common stock 
known as acquisition currency (Burns, 2004). 
 
Brown and Warner (1985) and Alexander et al (1988) have reiterated that common stock 
price reaction to cross listings could provide a basis to draw inferences with regard to 
capital market integration and segmentation. Based on an examination by Howe and 
Kelm (1987) of 165 US firm-listings on the Basel, Paris, and Frankfurt common stock 
market exchanges, they found negative abnormal returns prior to cross-listing and mixed 
non positive returns thereafter. Their findings suggest that cross listings be avoided if the 
aim is to maximise shareholder wealth. However, Lau et al (1994) enlarged their sample 
to include 10 major foreign common stock market Exchanges to observe insignificant 
pre-listing returns but significant post-listing returns. 
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With a doubling of the number of non-US firms cross-listing in the US between 1990 and 
2003 (Karolyi, 2006), it is pertinent to focus on this area. Alexander et al (1988) record 
positive pre-listing returns throughout the sample. Jayaraman et al (1993) have showed 
abnormal returns on the listing day, implying that there was value in cross-listing. Miller 
(1999) observes a positive 1.15% average abnormal return during the 3 days 
surrounding the announcement date, based on 181 ADRs between 1985 and 1995.  He 
concluded that the net benefits of cross-listing are from overcoming market barriers, after 
controlling for institutional and geographical differences in the DR structures. This finding 
is consistent with the market segmentation hypothesis. Foerster and Karolyi (1999) 
adopted the same methodology but used weekly data between 1976 and 1992. Pre-
listing abnormal returns of 10% and an average 9% decline thereafter were observed. 
They suggest that the market segmentation hypothesis is inadequate and that strategic 
market timing may well be a possible explanation. A comparison of their event study 
results centred on the announcement and listing dates shows similar results, albeit with 
the latter showing greater statistical significance. Abdallah and Ioannidis (2010) 
extended their studies and had similar results. Thus, firms will cross-list in a period of 
good performance to capitalise on the overvaluation of the common share prices in their 
domestic markets. It explains the significant decline in abnormal returns (AR) after listing. 
The higher the pre cross-listing AR, the higher the subsequent decline in the post listing 
AR, a key observation that is  consistent with that of initial public offerings (IPOs). In 
general, there has been no consensus on common stock price reactions to cross-listing. 
There are variations in not just the outcomes but in also the magnitude. 
 
Progressing from the Capital Asset Pricing Model of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965), 
Solnik (1974) introduced the International Asset Pricing Model (IAPM). However, the 
IAPM focused on a world market portfolio and neglected domestic market risks. Howe 
and Madura (1990) compared the risks before and after listing. They estimated a single-
index model based on the domestic market, and a separate double-index model based 
on the domestic and foreign markets, before attempting to compare the betas of the 
domestic market from both models.  The local market beta saw slight declines, none of 
which was significant even after further disaggregating the results to the origins of listing. 
Similarly, the differences between the foreign market betas were, on average, 
insignificantly different from zero. They conclude that cross-listings do not cause 
significant shifts in risk. Subsequent studies by Foerster and Karolyi (1999), Baker et al 
(2002) and by Abdallah and Ioannidis (2010) augmented Schipper and Thompson 
(1983)’s methodology in modifying the IAPM to estimate a two-factor model to capture 
both domestic and foreign market betas  
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Listing options have varying requirements, ranging from the lowest in private placements 
to the highest in common stock market exchange listings. It leads to varying levels of 
information availability and so cumulates into a “rank order” of impacts (Hail and Leuz, 
2009).  Such a rank order is discovered in cross-sectional analysis. Miller (1999) 
documented that abnormal returns were largest for those firms that listed on major US 
common stock market exchanges and were smallest for those firms that listed on the 
‘Portal’. Doidge et al (2004) found that exchange listings have large, positive premiums 
(as proxied by Tobin’s Q) that were statistically significant. There was no significant 
premium for private placements. Capital-raising exchange listings were found to have a 
significantly higher premium than those without. Hail and Leuz (2009) observed that the 
reduction in the cost of capital is larger for exchange listings than those of private 
placements, and that the effects were sustained for many years thereafter. They 
explained that private placements experienced higher costs owing to information 
disparity arising from private communication among market makers.  Doidge et al (2009) 
perceived the differences to be owing to barriers on the consumption of private benefits 
of control and they showed that the value of private benefits of control was lower for 
exchange listings, resulting in greater firm value. The findings are consistent with the 
bonding hypothesis, which posits that increased disclosure and monitoring, leads to a 
reduction of agency costs for controlling shareholders. In almost all aspects, rank order 
explains the varying impacts of cross listing. 
 
On the whole, there is limited evidence with an international focus and there has been 
mixed results with little conclusive evidence on the effects of cross listing. The literature 
is focused on the US as the host country or on US firms listing overseas. There is also a 
dearth in the literature on the effects of cross listing for REITs. 
 
Data and Methodology 
 
Publicly listed REITs from several countries were obtained from Bloomberg online 
information system - Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hong Kong, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Thailand, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, the UK and US. REITs 
concurrently listed on more than one Securities Exchange were identified (see Table 1), 
and their cross-listing dates were double checked with annual reports. 
  
To identify REITs with DRs, a full list of ADRs and GDRs was obtained from the directory 
of various official depositary institutions: JP Morgan Chase, Bank of New York Mellon, 
Citibank and Deutsche Bank. This was matched with the above list of all publicly listed 
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REITs to identify the REITs with DRs. Furthermore the International Securities 
Identification Number (ISIN) was used to ensure correct matching of DRs to REITs. The 
data set includes DRs that have terminated to avoid the problem of survivorship bias 
(see Table 3 for REITs with DRs). 
 
We adopt the event study methodology of Brown and Warner (1985) to examine the 
behaviour of REIT security prices to cross-listing events through abnormal returns. This 
methodology tests for market efficiency through the evaluation of price adjustment before 
and after an event. Abnormal returns (ARs) for each REIT, Equation (1) are based on 
daily returns, Equation (2).   
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 −  𝑁𝑅𝑖𝑡                                                                                                         (1) 
, where 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 denotes the abnormal return for REIT 𝑖 at day 𝑡, 𝑅𝑡 is the observed or actual 
return for REIT 𝑖 at day 𝑡, and 𝑁𝑅𝑡  is the normal return for REIT 𝑖 at day 𝑡, which is 
calculated through the market model. Normal returns exist in the absence of significant 
events. 
 
We adhere to the study by Abdallah and Ioannidis (2010) that uses 200 trading days of 
successive daily price data from day -300 to -101 as its estimation period, relative to day 
0, the event/listing date. The listing date is selected instead of the annoucement date 
because it is invokes greater certainty. Foerster and Karolyi (1999) shows that there is 
greater statistical significance associated with the listing date. The event window (-100, 
+250) comprises 351 days in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Timeline of Event Study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (Source: Authors, 2016) 
 
 𝐷𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 =
𝑃𝑡− 𝑃𝑡−1
𝑃𝑡−1
        (2) 
, where 𝑃𝑡 is the closing price of a given day, and 𝑃𝑡−1 is the closing price for the previous 
trading day.  Daily prices are used as they increase the reliability of the tests and ensure 
greater robustness (Schotman and Zalewska, 2006; Abdallah and Ioannidis, 2010). 
 
0 -100 +250 -300 
Trading days 
Estimation period Event window 
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We also adopt the market model of Dyckman et al (1984), Equation (3), as it accounts 
for variations in the individual securities’ returns associated with market-wide impacts, 
thereby reducing the variance in abnormal returns: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑅𝑚𝑡 +  𝜀𝑡         (3) 
., were 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the residual of the market model for REIT 𝑖, returns, 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the returns on 
the market portfolio for a given day, 𝛼 and 𝛽 are estimated parameters and 𝜀𝑡  is the 
disturbance term. 𝜀𝑡 is independent and has zero expectation.  
Equation (4) measures the market’s reaction to cross-listing REITs. 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 −  (?̂? +  ?̂? 𝑅𝑚𝑡
𝐿 )                                                                                        (4) 
, where ?̂? and ?̂? are ordinary least-square estimates. Positive ARs imply favourable 
market reaction towards REITs. The corresponding common stock market exchanges’ 
benchmark indices of the domestic exchange listing are used for 𝑅𝑚𝑡
𝐿 ,. The cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs), Equation (5), denote the aggregation of ARs from the start to 
the end of the event window (−100, to + 250): 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐴𝑅𝑡1 + ⋯ + 𝐴𝑅𝑡2 =  ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡1                         (5) 
The CARs are averaged each day across all REITs to obtain the cumulative average 
abnormal returns (CAAR), Equation (6): 
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡 =  
∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑡=1
𝑁
         (6) 
, where N denotes the number of REITs in the sample for each day during the event 
window (-100, +250). J-statistics by Campbell et al (1997) are estimated to enhance the 
robustness of the AR analysis: 
𝐽1,𝑒 =
∑ ∑ 𝛾𝑒𝑘𝑖
𝐾𝑖
𝑘=1
𝑊
𝑖=1
√∑ ∑ 𝜎𝑒𝑖
2𝐾𝑗
𝑘=1
𝑊
𝑖=1
         (7) 
𝐽2,𝑒 =
1
√𝑁
 ∑ ∑
𝛾𝑒𝑘𝑖
𝜎𝑒𝑘𝑖
𝐾𝑖
𝑘=1
𝑊
𝑖=1         (8) 
, where N denotes the number of days within the event window, 𝛾  denotes the AR 
estimate and 𝜎 denotes the standard error of the AR estimate, based on eq (4). The 
standard error is based on the estimation period of (-300, -101) days. Under the null 
hypothesis, the ARs ought to follow a zero-mean normal distribution. J1 and J2 will have 
an approximate standard normal distribution each, and are considered significant if each 
J exceeds 2.0 in absolute terms. The use of J-statistics is necessary as event studies 
test whether the event-induced AR is zero, and whether the model used to compute the 
expected returns is correct. J-statistics is said to be the omnibus test-statistic for model 
mis-specification. Furthermore the distribution of long-run AR is positively skewed, and 
a skewness-adjusted t-test, J-test, originally developed by Johnson (1978) is used to 
overcome the skewness bias (Kothari and Warner, 1997; Lyon et al., 1999). 
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Lastly, we follow the methodology of Foerster and Karolyi (1999), Baker et al (2002) and 
of Abdallah and Ioannidis (2010), to examine the returns and risk behaviour of the REIT 
sample through a cross-sectional, two-factor IAPM. This methodology takes account of 
the fact that the covariance risks of an IAPM, for example that of Solnik (1974), are only 
defined in terms of the global market portfolio. This ignores local market risks that may 
affect prices of interlisting stocks from markets that are not integrated (Foerster and 
Karolyi, 1999). Given that the paper is partly aimed at ascertaining the impact of cross-
listing on both local and foreign market risks, it estimates a modified IAPM (Equation [9]) 
that captures both domestic and foreign market risks and their changes over time (see 
Foerster and Karolyi, 1999). The domestic market risk is computed relative to the local 
market index while the foreign market beta is based on the foreign market index. Thus, 
the paper follows Schipper and Thompson (1983) to pool the cross-section and time 
series of returns to estimate the two-factor IAPM, Equation (9), which revolves around 
the listing date (day 0) for the period of day (-250, +250): 
 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖
𝑃𝑅𝐸 + 𝛽𝑖𝐿
𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑚𝑡
𝐿 +  𝛽𝑖𝐹
𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑚𝑡
𝐹 + 𝛼𝑖
𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇 + 𝛼𝑖
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 + 𝛽𝑖𝐿
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑚𝑡
𝐿 𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 +
𝛽𝑖𝐹
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑚𝑡
𝐹 𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡         (9) 
 
, where PRE denotes the pre-listing period of (-250, -2) days, LIST denotes the listing 
period of (-1, +1) days, POST denotes the post-listing period of (+2, +250) days; 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is 
the daily total return for REIT 𝑖  at time 𝑡 ; 𝛼𝑖
𝑃𝑅𝐸 , 𝛼𝑖
𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇 , 𝛼𝑖
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇  are alphas coefficients 
denoting the abnormal returns; 𝛽𝑖𝐿
𝑃𝑅𝐸, 𝛽𝑖𝐿
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 are the beta coefficients correlated to the 
domestic market index 𝑅𝑚𝑡
𝐿 , i.e. domestic market risk; 𝛽𝑖𝐹
𝑃𝑅𝐸 ,  𝛽𝑖𝐹
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 are the beta 
coefficients correlated to the foreign market index 𝑅𝑚𝑡
𝐹 , i.e. the foreign market risk; 
𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇is a dummy variable, taking the value of one in the three days (-1, 0, +1) around the 
cross-listing date and zero otherwise; 𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 is a dummy variable, taking the value of one 
in the post-listing period (+2, +250) and zero otherwise. The event study methodology is 
linked to the IAPM parameters through the alpha coefficients of  𝛼𝑖
𝑃𝑅𝐸 , 𝛼𝑖
𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇 , 𝛼𝑖
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇, as 
captured by the abnormal returns in the former. Alpha coefficients capture the short-run 
and long-run abnormal performances. The benefits of cross listing are demonstrated by 
respective increases in 𝛼𝑖
𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝛼𝑖
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇as compared to the 𝛼𝑖
𝑃𝑅𝐸  to imply that cross-
listing reduces  domestic market risk.  Similarly, 𝛽𝑖𝐹
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇will be higher than 𝛽𝑖𝐹
𝑃𝑅𝐸 to imply 
higher foreign market  risk after cross listing owing to greater exposure to global market 
risk. Risk diversification improves as long as the reduction in domestic market beta (in 
absolute terms) is higher than the increase in foreign market beta. The paper duly utilizes 
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the two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank test and the t-distribution to check the robustness of 
the regression parameters. 
 
 
Total returns (net of dividends) for REIT and market indices data are utilised and 
standardised on a single currency in US dollar terms to eliminate currency risk. The 
domestic market index is based on the benchmark index of the domestic common stock 
market exchange. For the foreign market index, the dual-exchange-listed REITs are 
based on the benchmark index of their second listing while the DRs use a standardised 
MSCI World Market Index as proxy, following the studies by Foerster and Karolyi (1999) 
and by Abdallah and Ioannidis (2010) that use a world index for the DRs. To assess the 
effects of cross listing, REITs that do not have a sufficient period of time between its first 
listing and its cross-listing, and that are identified earlier to be a 300-day period in the 
methodology, are eliminated. REITs with missing data for the period of (-300, +250) days 
relative to the cross-listing date (day 0) are also eliminated.  Tables 4 and 5 present the 
final list to be examined. 
 
Table 4. Final List of Dual Exchange-Listed REITs and Their Benchmark Indices 
 First Listing1 Dual Listing2 
1. Associated Estates 
Realty Corporation3 
New York Stock 
Exchange 
 
NYSE 
Composite 
NASDAQ NASDAQ 
Composite 
2. Fortune Real Estate 
Investment Trust 
Singapore Stock 
Exchange 
 
Straits Times 
Index 
Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange  
Hang Seng 
Index 
3. Intercapital Property 
Development REIT 
 
Bulgaria Stock 
Exchange 
SOFIX Warsaw Stock 
Exchange 
WIG 
                                               
1 First listing may be interchangeably used with ‘local’ listing. Although Fortune Real Estate Investment Trust 
is Hong Kong-based, the Singapore Stock Exchange is still considered its local listing.  
2 Dual listing may be interchangeably used with ‘foreign’ listing. It denotes the second listing although 
Associated Estates Realty Corporation’s listings are both in the same country, the ‘foreign’ listing refers to 
its second listing. 
3 While Associated Estates Realty Corporation’s listings are in the same country, the second listing is 
considered its dual or ‘foreign’ listing. It is still included because of limited data and that the NYSE and 
NASDAQ are two separate major exchanges. 
 
 
(Source: Authors, 2016) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 
 
 
 
Table 5. Final List of REITs with Depositary Receipts and Their Benchmark 
Indices4 
 Tradin
g 
Board 
Country Benchmark 
Index 
Main Stock 
Listing 
Date 
DR 
Effective 
Date 
1. Westfield Group OTC Australia ASX 200 5-Jul-2004 21-Nov-
2006 
2. Elarg Agricultural 
Land Opportunity 
Fund 
Reg S Bulgaria SOFIX 15-Jun-
2005 
1-Mar-2007 
3. Mercialys SA OTC France CAC 40 12-Oct-
2005 
13-Aug-
2009 
4. Unibail-Rodamco 
SE 
OTC France CAC 40 22-Jun-
2007 
15-Jan-
2009 
5. Property for 
Industry Limited 
OTC New 
Zealand 
NZX 50 12-Dec-
1994 
24-Oct-
2008 
6. Primary Health 
Properties PLC 
OTC United 
Kingdom 
FTSE 100 5-Nov-1998 31-Mar-
2008 
(Source: Authors, 2012; 2016) 
 
Results and Findings – Whether Cross Listing Has Positive Valuation Effect 
Table 6 presents the mean daily total returns for all the cross-listed REITs relative to the 
listing day (Day 0). Average daily returns for both the pre-cross-listing period (-250, -2) 
and the cross-listing period (-1, +1) are negative (-0.00002 and -0.00487 respectively) 
and statistically insignificant. The mean daily return for the post-cross listing period (+2, 
+250) is positive (0.0062) but remains statistically insignificant. The same trend is 
observed for REITs with depositary receipts but with a notable exception that the positive 
mean daily return (0.00129) for the post-cross-listing period is statistically significant at 
the 0.05 level of significance. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
4 Although some REITs may have been listed prior to being a REIT (REIT legislation being introduced 
later), they are included if the DR effective date is after REIT conversion. 
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Table 6. Daily Returns of Cross-listed REITs 
  Pre-cross-listing 
(-250, -2) 
 Cross-listing 
(-1, +1) 
 Post-cross-listing 
(+2, +250) 
  N Mean  n Mean  n Mean 
All REITs  2241 -0.00002  27 -0.00487  2241 0.00062 
                    
   Depositary Receipts  1494 -0.00036  18 -0.00577  1494 0.00129 ** 
 
   Dual Ordinary Listings  747 0.00066  9 -0.00308  747 -0.00072 
** indicates significance at 5% level (source: Authors, 2012; 2016). 
 
The opposite trend applies to REITs with dual ordinary listings. The positive pre-cross- 
listing mean daily return (0.00066) changes to negative after cross-listing (Table 6 Row 
3). Apart from being statistically insignificant, the trend for DOL REITs is similar to that 
of companies after their initial public offerings (Abdallah and Ioannidis, 2010). 
Nevertheless, there is a dip in the mean daily returns during the cross listing period and 
a rebound after the cross listing although the return is insignificant. A possible 
explanation may be that as there is hardly any precedent in REITs cross listing, market 
participants may adopt a wait-and-observe approach. 
 
These initial findings are not surprising as there is hardly any difference between the 
pairs of related exchanges. Associated Estates Realty Corporation is listed on the NYSE 
and NASDAQ, both in the US. This hardly confers any of the benefits of cross-listing. 
Secondly, Miller (1999) finds that the return for exchange listing is significantly higher 
than for OTC listings. Thus cross-listing Associated Estates Realty Corporation securities 
on NASDAQ after first listing on NYSE is likely to have negative impact on the mean 
daily returns during the cross-listing and the post-cross-listing periods to result in the 
figures in Table 6. Similarly, Dodd and Loucas (2012 ) find no evidence that cross-listing 
in continental Europe has significant stock value-enhancement effect. Moreover 
Singapore and Hong Kong are the two giant exchanges in ASEAN. There is not much 
difference between them to provide stock value-enhancement through cross-listing – 
Significant valuation gains could have resulted if Hong Kong Exchange were more 
prestigious than Singapore Exchange (Cetorelli and Peristiani, 2015). Therefore the 
preliminary findings in Table 6 are consistent with the extant literature. However, there 
is a glimmer of hope in the seemingly discouraging overall results in Table 6 as DR 
provide a statistically significant positive mean daily post-cross-listing return (0.00129). 
In other words, while the overall (ALL REITs) cross-listed positive valuation effect is not 
statistically significant, cross-listing REITs through DRs have statistically significant 
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positive valuation effect to provide an attractive investment option for investors. However 
investors should shy away from DOLs given the negative valuation effect (Table 6) on 
stock values. 
 
Do ARs and CARs Evidence Cross-listing Stock Value-enhancement Effect? 
Table 7 presents the average daily abnormal returns (AR) and the cumulative average 
abnormal returns (CAR) for the event period of Day -100 to Day +250.  The figures in 
Table 7, which are a measure of REIT stock price reaction to REIT cross-listing, have 
been categorized to distinguish between DR listings and DOL. The hypothesis being 
tested here is that cross-listing REITs does not have statistically significant REIT stock 
value-enhancement effect. 
 
 
The results in Table 7, Column 2, show that the ARs for all the 9 cross-listed REITs are 
generally positive throughout the event window. However only five ARs are significant at 
the conventional levels of statistical significance. The highest statistically significant AR 
(+0.01511) was registered on Day -30, i.e. 30 days before the listing day (Day 0). The 
AR fell to +0.00116 on Day -1 but bounced back on the event day to +0.00566 albeit not 
statistically significant. The AR reached statistical significance on Days 25 (+0.01414), 
109 (+0.01093) and 208 (+0.00334) after cross-listing (see Table 7, Column 2). This 
implies that investors would have been better off, on the basis of ARs, selling their 
investments on day 25 after the event day. It must be noted that the foregoing 
commentary on ALL REITs’ ARs is based on statistical significance premised on the 
basic t-test (often found in event studies) which is not adjusted for the skewness. The 
results of the J-test, a skewness-adjusted t-test (see Johnson, 1978; Campbell et al., 
1997; Lyon et al., 1999) are presented in Table 8. The J1 and J2 statistics for ALL REITs 
(Table 8) exceed 2.0 in absolute terms to imply that the corresponding ARs are 
significantly different from zero. Thus, the results reject the null hypothesis that cross-
listing does not have stock value-enhancement effect to conclude that cross-listing 
REITs has statistically significant positive REIT stock performance effect. In simple 
terms, cross-listing leads to superior returns for REITs in general. 
 
 Positive ARs may well signal that the market is positively anticipating that the REITs 
perform better after cross listing. Furthermore the CARs for all cross-listed REITs (ALL 
REITs, column 4 of Table 7) are generally statistically significant at the conventional 
levels and follow an upward trend.   The occurrence of positive CARs throughout the 
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event window is consistent with the study by Foerster and Karolyi (1999), implying a 
decrease in the cost of equity capital and an increase in the value of REIT stock. 
A similar pattern for ARs and CARs is observed for REITs with depositary receipts and 
dual ordinary listings. In the former, the ARs are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
on many occasions before and after the listing date. This is supported by the J1 and J2 
statistics of 2.170 and 2.250 respectively in Table 8. The highest AR (0.02409) occurred 
30 days after listing and is significant at the 5% level while the lowest AR (-0.00836) 
occurred 178 days after listing and is significant (1% level). There is evidence of positive 
CARs at the 5% and 10% levels after the listing date. This may signal that the market 
anticipates that REITs with depositary receipts perform better following the cross listing. 
Although the same pattern occurs for REITs with dual ordinary listings, none of the 
results are significant. 
 
During the cross-listing period (-1, +1), the ARs from Table 7 are all positive although 
insignificant, implying that REITs’ values should increase to reflect lower expected 
returns (Serra, 1999). Another trend between REITs with depositary receipts and those 
with dual ordinary listings is that the average ARs are larger for the latter (0.00128) than 
for the former (0.00104). As REITs with depositary receipts either trade on ‘OTC’ (over 
the counter) or on the ‘Portal’, the institutional differences can be examined with 
reference to the effects of market barriers on common stock prices.  This is consistent 
with the findings of Miller (1999) that greater liquidity and broader shareholder base 
increase shareholder wealth. 
 
From Figure 3, the CARs of REITs with dual ordinary listings diverge from the start and 
they record a much higher magnitude than REITs with depositary receipts, before    
eventually converging again towards day 250. This is possibly due to institutional 
differences between the two cross listing forms. More stringent requirements of dual 
ordinary listings may be seen as a commitment towards investor protection, supporting 
the bonding hypothesis. This is consistent with the findings of Doidge et al (2004) that 
the valuation premium is generally greater for the exchange listings than the Level 1 or 
Rule 144A ADRs, as per the rank order effect.
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Table 7. Event Study Results of Cross-listed REITs 
    All REITs         Depositary Receipts       Dual Ordinary Listings   
Day   AR T-stat CAR T-stat   AR T-stat CAR T-stat   AR T-stat CAR T-stat 
-100 
 
0.00799 1.433 0.00799 1.433 
 
0.01072 1.464 0.01072 1.464 
 
0.00253 0.278 0.00253 0.278 
-96 
 
0.00604 *** 4.485 0.00239 0.136 
 
0.00780 *** 5.108 -0.01255 -0.672 
 
0.00253 2.665 0.03227 0.898 
-70 
 
0.00007 0.022 0.08762 ** 2.612 
 
0.00430 * 2.098 0.04787 * 2.196 
 
-0.00840 -1.558 0.16714 2.091 
-60 
 
-0.00253 -0.639 0.08707 * 2.145 
 
-0.00592 -1.139 0.03994 1.460 
 
0.00425 0.985 0.18133 1.874 
-50 
 
-0.00040 -0.039 0.08959 1.403 
 
0.00676 0.500 0.01946 0.400 
 
-0.01473 -1.013 0.22986 1.537 
-40 
 
-0.00809 -0.596 0.10510 1.545 
 
0.00438 0.289 0.04449 0.672 
 
-0.03302 -1.355 0.22634 1.506 
-30 
 
0.01511 ** 2.862 0.12182 * 1.876 
 
0.01461 ** 3.976 0.05947 0.973 
 
0.01611 0.987 0.24654 1.733 
-20 
 
0.00661 1.619 0.14213 * 2.156 
 
0.00394 0.965 0.06750 1.221 
 
0.01196 1.225 0.29141 2.053 
-10 
 
0.00717 1.396 0.15160 * 2.093 
 
0.00982 1.336 0.06368 1.048 
 
0.00187 0.373 0.32745 2.243 
-1 
 
0.00116 0.123 0.18929 * 2.120 
 
-0.00826 -0.909 0.08912 1.229 
 
0.02000 1.015 0.38963 1.966 
0 
 
0.00566 0.986 0.19495 * 2.163 
 
0.01135 1.510 0.10047 1.261 
 
-0.00572 -1.472 0.38391 1.944 
1 
 
0.00301 0.284 0.19796 ** 2.334 
 
0.00696 0.445 0.10742 1.602 
 
-0.00487 -0.524 0.37904 1.913 
10 
 
0.01221 1.737 0.19784 * 2.306 
 
0.00902 1.115 0.10815 1.662 
 
0.01857 1.212 0.37721 1.818 
20 
 
0.00736 1.429 0.21429 ** 2.526 
 
0.01023 1.361 0.13153 1.825 
 
0.00161 0.501 0.37983 1.903 
25 
 
0.01414 ** 2.771 0.23214 ** 2.610 
 
0.01276 ** 3.432 0.14234 * 2.141 
 
0.01690 1.096 0.41175 1.868 
30 
 
0.01350 1.281 0.25344 ** 2.901 
 
0.02409 ** 2.829 0.17367 ** 2.697 
 
-0.00769 -0.306 0.41298 1.815 
40 
 
0.00392 0.595 0.27960 ** 2.566 
 
0.00621 0.619 0.18305 ** 2.710 
 
-0.00065 -0.400 0.47271 1.561 
50 
 
-0.00125 -0.271 0.30315 ** 2.723 
 
-0.00403 -0.610 0.20579 ** 2.840 
 
0.00429 1.071 0.49785 1.623 
60 
 
0.00967 0.840 0.25401 * 1.969 
 
-0.00234 -0.510 0.20809 ** 2.888 
 
0.03369 1.038 0.34586 0.845 
70 
 
0.00242 0.291 0.24374 1.787 
 
-0.00456 -0.488 0.20219 ** 3.197 
 
0.01637 1.042 0.32685 0.734 
100 
 
0.00135 0.232 0.26992 ** 2.521 
 
0.00478 0.902 0.20712 1.947 
 
-0.00552 -0.364 0.39551 1.504 
109 
 
0.01093 *** 4.203 0.32417 ** 2.437 
 
0.01394 *** 4.396 0.25112 1.917 
 
0.00492 2.520 0.47027 1.414 
120 
 
-0.00754 -0.830 0.34569 ** 2.469 
 
0.00306 0.340 0.28667 * 2.108 
 
-0.02873 -1.818 0.46372 1.275 
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150 
 
0.00150 0.309 0.40510 ** 2.557 
 
-0.00041 -0.075 0.30429 1.975 
 
0.00530 0.481 0.60672 1.556 
178 
 
0.00025 0.038 0.38445 ** 2.421 
 
-0.00865 *** -4.983 0.29714 1.953 
 
0.01805 1.130 0.55907 1.380 
200 
 
0.00595 1.844 0.39027 ** 2.337 
 
0.00595 1.244 0.32661 1.863 
 
0.00596 1.806 0.51759 1.260 
208 
 
0.00334 * 1.983 0.40369 ** 2.378 
 
0.0059 *** 4.908 0.35617 1.919 
 
-0.00179 -0.670 0.49873 1.221 
230 
 
0.00120 0.241 0.40967 ** 2.344 
 
0.00321 0.432 0.37405 1.978 
 
-0.00282 -0.952 0.48091 1.122 
250   0.00281 0.395 0.39267 * 2.120   -0.00578 -0.804 0.36466 1.997   0.01999 1.772 0.44869 0.911 
Mean 
 
0.00112 
    
0.00104 
    
0.00128 
   
***, **, * indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels (source: authors, 2012; 2016). 
 
 
 
Table 8.  J-statistics of Event Study Results on Abnormal Returns 
 
All REITs 
 
Depositary Receipts 
 
Dual Ordinary Listings 
J1 statistics 2.611 
 
2.170 
 
1.491 
J2 statistics 2.804 
 
2.250 
 
1.675 
(Source: Authors, 2012; 2016) 
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Figure 3. Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Cross-Listed REITs
 
(Source; Authors, 2012 & 2016) 
 
 
In Figure 3, the CARs peak at around the 140th day after cross listing. While it begins to stagnate 
for all the cross-listed REITs, REITs with dual ordinary listings begin to see a decrease. It shows that 
there are more negative ARs subsequently. Table 9 presents the percentage of positive ARs during 
the event window. It is observed that the number of positive abnormal returns fall after the cross 
listing for all REITs. This is line with the literature that significant negative abnormal returns ought to 
occur in the long run to reflect lower expected returns (Serra, 1999). However, the decrease for those 
REITs with depositary receipts is less apparent.   
 
Table 9. Percentage of Positive Abnormal Returns during the Event Window 
% positive ARs    All REITs   Depositary Receipts   Dual Ordinary Listings 
  
     
  
Day (-100, -2) 
 
59.60% 
 
57.58% 
 
61.62% 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Day (+2, +250)   55.02% 
 
55.82% 
 
49.40% 
(Source: Authors, 2012; 2016) 
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Results of Cross-sectional Two-factor IAPM 
 
Table 10 presents the alpha coefficients for the cross-sectional, two-factor IAPM analysis of the 
event window (-250, +250). 𝛼 denotes the mean abnormal returns (ARs) and it is different from the 
event study’s ARs as total returns are used for the IAPM. The extra factor of the dividends is to be 
considered herewith. This is relevant to the REITs because they are required to distribute almost all 
their earnings as dividends, depending on the domestic market regulations. The IAPM ARs are also 
based upon the dual market exposure, thereby reflective of REITs. 
 
Table 10. Comparison of Alpha Coefficient Pre- and Post- Cross listing (t-statistic bracketed) 
 
Category  𝛼𝑖
𝑃𝑅𝐸 𝛼𝑖
𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇 𝛼𝑖
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 ∆ α 
All REITs 
 
 
-0.00009 
(-0.144) 
0.00013 
(1.978) 
0.00037 
(0.441) 
0.00046 
(-0.334) 
  
 
        
Depositary Receipts 
 
 
 
-0.00018 
(-0.340) 
 
0.00008 
(0.015) 
 
0.00099 
(1.290) 
 
0.00117 
(-1.988) 
 
Dual Ordinary 
Listings   
0.000234 
(0.167) 
0.00034 
(-0.475) 
-0.00094 
(-0.475) 
-0.00118 
(1.776) 
 
(Source; Authors, 2016) 
 
 
The increased post-cross-listing mean AR from negative to positive for ALL REITs and DR REITs, 
though not statistically significant, show that cross-listing had positive valuation effect. Conversely, 
DOL REITs experienced a fall in AR after cross listing to replicate  Lau et al (1994), Foerster and 
Karolyi (1999) and Abdallah and Ioannidis (2010). The result could be due to the “window of 
opportunity” effect as REIT managers usually take advantage of good market conditions to cross-list 
(Sarkissian and Schill, 2009; Fadl, 2010). In other words, managers might have ridden on the wave 
of good market sentiment, “window of opportunity” to cross list companies’ shares to facilitate 
attractive pricing (high enough to recoup the cost of cross linsting and make profit but acceptable to 
the market) of their cross listed shares. This means that investors might  have bought stocks at high 
prices that were not sustainable over the post-event window due to market sentiment returning to 
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the norm (i.e. due to  mean reversion). Furthermore the decline in the alpha (AR) for DOL 
after cross-listing could be attributable to the fact that the shares were dual-listed on 
exchanges that may be less reputable than the exchanges on which they were first listed 
(Dodd, 2013; Cetorelli and Peristiani, 2015; Dodd et al., 2015).  The IAPM results are 
consistent with those from the event study. It seems that while there are stronger 
abnormal returns for REITs with dual ordinary listings in the short run (see Figure 3), the 
benefits do not persist into the longer term. This is also observed in the change of the 
alpha coefficient. 
 
Impact of Cross-listing On the Risk of REIT Local Market 
 
Table 11 presents the domestic market beta coefficient, 𝛽𝑖𝐿, based on the IAPM event 
window of (-250, +250). The beta coefficient is significant throughout all categories 
during the pre- cross listing period (-250, -2). This is considerably reduced after the cross 
listing albeit insignificant. The change in the beta coefficient, ∆ 𝛽𝑖𝐿 , is negative and 
significant for all REITs (-0.55977) and for REITs with depositary receipts (-0.54459). It 
implies a significant change in the domestic market beta coefficient and is consistent with 
the studies by Foerster and Karolyi (1999) and by Abdallah and Ioannidis (2010). 
 
Table 11. Comparison of Local-market Beta Coefficient Pre- and Post- Cross 
Listing (t-statistic bracketed) 
Category  𝛽𝑖𝐿
𝑃𝑅𝐸 𝛽𝑖𝐿
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 ∆ 𝛽𝑖𝐿 
All REITs 
 
 
0.56123 *** 
(12.879) 
0.00145 
(0.023) 
-0.55977 ** 
(3.057) 
  
 
      
Depositary Receipts 
 
 
 
0.58974 *** 
(15.847) 
 
0.04515 
(0.855) 
 
-0.54459 ** 
(2.594) 
 
Dual Ordinary 
Listings   
0.35505 ** 
(2.466) 
0.03336 
(0.173) 
-0.32169 
(1.349) 
***, ** indicates significance at 1% and 5% level (source: authors, 2016) 
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Representing the REITs’ volatility to the domestic common stock market, the reduction 
in the domestic market beta coefficient concurs with the market segmentation 
hypothesis.  By overcoming market barriers, the risk can be diversified away. 
 
Impact of Cross-listing on Foreign Market Risk 
Table 12 presents the foreign market beta coefficients based on the IAPM event window 
of (-250, +250). Foreign market beta coefficients for all REITs before cross listing 
(1.0265) and after cross listing (0.19433) are significant at the 5% and 1% levels, 
indicating an almost double increase for the foreign market beta. Nevertheless, the ∆ 𝛽𝑖𝐹 
did not yield any significance from the paired-sample mean t-test. For REITs with 
depositary receipts, 𝛽𝑖𝐹
𝑃𝑅𝐸  is significant at the 5% level before cross listing (0.10857) but 
becomes insignificant subsequently. For REITs with dual ordinary listings, 𝛽𝑖𝐹
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇  is 
significant after cross listing (0.42621) but insignificant prior to that. Regardless, the ∆𝛽𝑖𝐹 
varies across all categories and is insignificant throughout. This is in line with studies by 
Foerster and Karolyi (1999) and by Abdallah and Ioannidis (2010), which had mixed 
results and likewise did not yield significant changes to the foreign market risk. 
 
 
Table 12. Comparison of Foreign Market Beta Coefficient Pre- and Post- Cross 
Listing (t-statistic bracketed). 
Category  𝛽𝑖𝐹
𝑃𝑅𝐸 𝛽𝑖𝐹
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 ∆ 𝛽𝑖𝐹 
All REITs 
 
 
0.10265 ** 
(1.978) 
0.19433 *** 
(2.609) 
0.09168 
(-0.013) 
  
 
      
Depositary Receipts 
 
 
 
0.10857 ** 
(2.118) 
 
-0.01846 
(-0.253) 
 
-0.12703 
(0.534) 
 
Dual Ordinary 
Listings   
0.16307 
(1.410) 
0.42621** 
(2.481) 
0.26313 
(-0.568) 
***, ** indicates significance at 1% and 5% levels (source: authors, 2016) 
 
 
According to the extant literature, diversification benefits occur only if the reduction in the 
domestic market beta is greater than the increase in the foreign market beta. A 
comparison of Tables 11 and 12 clearly reveals that the reductions in domestic market 
betas exceeds the increases in foreign market betas. Furthermore the differences 
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between pre- and post-listing foreign market betas are not statistically significant (Table 
12) while those for the domestic market betas are predominantly significantly different 
from zero (Table 11). These results imply that cross-listing REITs can provide 
diversification benefits. 
Conclusion 
The results show that all the cross-listed REITs (ALL REITs) recorded positive post-
cross-listing mean daily return that was statistically insignificant. However DR had 
positive valuation effect by posting a statistically significant post-cross-listing mean daily 
return while DOL had negative valuation effect by recording a statistically insignificant 
post-cross-listing mean daily return. 
 
Furthermore it was found that the ARs and CARs for ALL REITs were statistically 
significant. This implies that, overall, investors made decent returns from the cross-
listing. Similar results apply to DR but the results for DOL are statistically insignificant.  
 
Similar pattern of results is observed for the impact of cross-listing on local market beta. 
ALL REITs and DR experienced statistically significant reductions, while DOL registered 
a statistically insignificant reduction, in the local market beta. However, the foreign 
market beta coefficient yields statistically insignificant mixed results in magnitude and 
direction across all categories. Given the overall decline/increase in the local/foreign 
markets betas (-0.55977/+0.09168), it may be concluded that cross-listing could reduce 
overall systematic risk to facilitate a decline in the cost of capital and enhance stock 
value. Furthermore, the impact on systematic risk implies that  cross-listing REITs can 
reap diversification gains. The results of this pioneering study, which are consistent with 
the extant literature, may incentivise REIT managers to adopt cross-listing. As to whether 
they should consider DRs or DOLs, the former provides statistically significant superior 
results to DOL and thus, should be the more prudent choice.  
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